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The World Bank has been at the forefront of a redefinition of aid 
conditionality since the late 1990s. This has implied a change from providing 
finance in return for the promise of policy reforms, as was typical under structural 
adjustment, to a disbursement of funds conditional on the reforms that a country 
has already achieved. The latter practice has become known as aid ‘selectivity’ or 
performance-based aid. 
When aid flows are allocated selectively, donors set conditions on the policies 
and institutions of countries prior to disbursing aid. So funds are withheld from 
countries until they obligingly change their policies or institutions. 
The World Bank’s selectivity in aid allocations is based on an assessment tool 
called the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The CPIA is derived 
from the judgment of World Bank staff on a country’s performance on a set of 
macroeconomic, structural, social and governance criteria. See below a listing of 
the CPIA’s 16 components, grouped in four clusters.
               The CPI Components
 
Source: World Bank (2006). ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment.’
The CPIA essentially embodies a set of well-known neo-liberal economic norms 
that are awkwardly augmented with social and governance concerns. For 
example, the economic core of the CPIA reflects preferences for low inflation, 
a surplus budgetary position, minimal restrictions on trade and capital flows, 
‘flexible’ goods, labour and land markets, and the prohibition of directed credit. 
Furthermore, the imperatives in the social cluster are often inconsistent with 
the economic imperatives. The governance cluster is noteworthy for imposing a 
one-size-fits-all formula on countries that exhibit a very wide range of diversity. 
Also, both the social and governance priorities are simply added onto the 
predetermined and unaltered economic imperatives (see Van Waeyenberge 
2008). 
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The CPIA score feeds into a formula for aid allocations that is 16 times more sensitive to 
changes in policy and institutional variables than to changes in income per capita. One 
consequence is that developing countries scoring in the top performance quintile of 
the CPIA recently received on average five times as much World Bank aid per capita as 
countries in the bottom quintile. 
The implication is that the quality of a country’s policies and institutions, which are 
based on a set of predetermined norms, is more important than a country’s need for 
assistance. Hence, resources are directed to countries where it is alleged that they will be 
most effective, not necessarily where they are most needed. 
The Adverse Effects
The rewards to ‘good performing’ countries are also supposed to provide a 
‘demonstration effect’—namely, encourage ‘poor performing’ countries to adopt the 
World Bank’s predetermined policies and institutions. But this approach could have a 
particularly severe effect on low-income countries that remain highly dependent on aid 
as their main form of external finance. 
First, selective allocation of aid based on the CPIA risks locking in an extensive policy 
agenda with ambiguous, if not adverse, repercussions for growth. For instance, the CPIA 
persistently precludes the various types of strategic interventions that were successfully 
deployed by the East Asian tiger economies.
Second, aid selectivity hampers the ability of poor countries to raise their investment 
rates and/or protect their pro-poor expenditures. In such countries, aid represents a 
significant proportion of national budgets and total investment. Yet the underlying 
structural features of such economies mean that they are highly likely to have low CPIA 
scores. For example, the average per capita income of the countries in the top quintile of 
the CPIA ranking is at least three times the average per capita income of the countries in 
the bottom quintile. 
The CPIA approach also assumes that national governments have significant control 
over policy outcomes when many other domestic and international factors can have 
a much more powerful impact. These include a heavy debt burden, declining terms of 
trade, low productive capacity throughout the economy and a low skill base.
Third, such an aid delivery system can adversely affect the macroeconomic stability of 
countries with large aid/GDP ratios. Since the allocation formula for aid is sensitive to 
small changes in CPIA scores, especially for the governance criteria, the uncertainty and 
volatility of aid flows can be exacerbated. 
In sum, aid selectivity implies that aid effectiveness is assumed to depend exclusively 
on recipient behaviour, to the complete neglect of mitigating structural features of  the 
recipient country or other factors, unrelated to aid, that determine its environment.  
Furthermore, since the core of the CPIA continues to embody a set of predetermined 
neo-liberal norms, the Bank’s aid practices seem to have progressed little in recent years 
despite its purported graduation from the Washington Consensus. 
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